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ABSTRACT
This article synthesises AQ1
¶
psychology, economics and political science
theories that can explain market reaction to elections. In order to test
the theories, we conduct event studies of the impact of elections on the
interest rates on government bonds for 122 elections in 19 countries.
The efﬁcient market hypothesis states that rational markets immediately
incorporate all information relevant to asset prices. According to
psychology, human decision-making is quasi-rational. Market actors
should be slow to accept evidence that conﬂicts with previously held
opinions, leading them to under-react to new information. We show that
markets under-react to elections and that under-reaction is greater in
majoritarian countries because they provide more information to the
market. Assuming fully rational markets underestimates the impact of
elections and variations in impact across political systems. Most of the
literature on market constraint assumes rational markets and may thus
be underestimating the extent of market pressure in the aftermath of
elections and its distribution across different types of electoral systems.
Our results suggest that markets can calculate risk around elections, but
are slow to do so, thereby suggesting that the role of uncertainty and
the resort to heuristics is relatively minor.
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Introduction
Economics assumes rational actors, while psychological research suggests decision-making is quasi-
rational. We synthesise both approaches with comparative politics and test their ability to explain
market reactions to elections. The efﬁcient market hypothesis (EMH) states that rational markets
immediately incorporate all public information relevant to asset prices. The comparative politics of
democracy has shown that some political systems are more constrained than others. In majoritarian
systems, the executive is relatively free to change policies, but in consensual systems policy change
requires the agreement of several veto players. Election results in majoritarian countries convey more
information to markets about the value of investments than do elections in consensual countries.
Therefore, the less constrained the political system, the greater should be an efﬁcient market’s reac-
tion to an election. Psychologists have discovered a large range of ‘mindbugs’, which hamper rational
decision-making. One such limitation is conservatism, deﬁned as the under-weighting of new infor-
mation, especially when conﬂicting with previously held opinions. Finance researchers have shown
under-reaction to be pervasive in relation to public information about company stocks. If markets
are quasi-rational, the incorporation of election results into asset prices should be delayed. Conser-
vatism should also interact with comparative politics. Since majoritarian elections produce more
new information than consensual elections, the less constrained the political system the greater
should be the under-reaction. This has important implications for several political economy
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literatures. For example, the literature on market constraint tends to assume rational markets and,
therefore, may have underestimated the extent of market pressure in the aftermath of elections
and its distribution across political systems. Recently some have emphasised how markets cannot
always calculate risk and must resort to heuristics in situations of uncertainty. Our results suggest
this phenomenon is rare. Risk is calculated but more slowly than in efﬁcient market models.
We conduct event studies on 122 elections from 19 countries, focusing on 10-year government
bonds, the asset that is most closely associated with national political systems. An event study com-
pares changes in value after the event to a counterfactual derived from the previous performance of
the asset in question. The results provide more evidence in support of the quasi-rational theory. Asset
prices display under-reaction, as the impact of the election continues to increase after the election.
Interest rate changes following majoritarian elections are much greater than those following elec-
tions in consensual systems. Moreover, comparative politics can also explain variations in under-reac-
tion. Behavioural economics has hitherto had a substantial, but uneven, impact on political science
(Wilson 2011). Quasi-rational markets have important implications for the study of political science,
as well as for how politicians, ﬁnance professionals, journalists and citizens think about the relation-
ship between elections and ﬁnancial markets.
The article proceeds conventionally. The next section reviews the relevant literatures from political
science, ﬁnance and psychology and then presents our theory and hypotheses. Then we explain our
methodology with a particular emphasis on event studies. The analysis section evaluates each
hypothesis and presents robustness tests. Finally, we conclude and mention some of the academic
and practical implications of our work.
Theory
The efﬁcient market hypothesis
The EMH states that markets should immediately and rationally react to new information relevant to
asset prices (Fama 1970, Malkiel 2003). This hypothesis rules out psychological biases.1 Efﬁcient
markets ‘price in’ the probability of relevant developments. If traders are sure that an event will
happen, for example that a particular party will win an election, then no impact will be observable
around the date of the election itself. The combination of efﬁcient markets and gradual information
release makes it difﬁcult to estimate the impact of events. Nonetheless, ‘pricing in’ is a revision of a
probability estimate and this should always be less than one until the event itself has happened.
Indeed, if markets really do process information rationally, they should attach probabilities of
much less than one to any predictions on which they base their investments. Thus, even if an
event is anticipated, some impact should be observable.
The EMH can potentially be criticised on several grounds. It assumes that markets can and do price
risk. However, in some situations markets may be so uncertain that they do not know how to relate
information to prices and instead resort to heuristics. This distinction between risk and uncertainty
can be useful in understanding unusual situations such as the global financial crisis when existing
models ceased to be relevant (Knight 1921, Keynes 1948[1921] AQ2
¶
, Nelson and Katzenstein 2014,
Paudyn 2014). In cases such as these, market actors are aware of the failure of efﬁciency. We deal
with a more normal situation and one in which investors are unaware of departures from rationality.
In other words, we stay in the conventional world of risk, but argue that risk is initially miscalculated.
Conservatism and under-reaction
Psychological experiments have discovered a range of heuristics and biases that hamper rational
decision-making.2 Behavioural economists have adapted this branch of psychology to explain and
predict behaviour that is regarded as anomalous according to the rational choice paradigm. Prospect
theory has proved particularly popular with economists, as its predictions accurately deal with
2 I. MCMENAMIN ET AL.
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variations in probability and losses and gains in decision-making. A recent and promising suggestion
is that the apparently diverse range of biases can be explained by noise in the memory-based link
between evidence and decisions (Hilbert 2012). One such bias is conservatism in processing of evi-
dence. Decades of experiments have shown that humans revise probabilities in proportion to calcu-
lations from Bayes’ theorem, but in insufﬁcient amounts. Here is a classic experiment that
demonstrates conservatism:
This bookbag contains 1,000 poker chips. I started out with two such bags, one containing 700 red and 300 blue
chips, the other containing 300 red and 700 blue. I ﬂipped a coin to determine which to use. Thus,… your prob-
ability at the moment that this is the predominantly red bookbag is 0.5. Now you sample, randomly, with replace-
ment after each chip. In 12 samples, you get 8 reds and 4 blues… [W]hat is the probability that this is the
predominantly red bag?… If you are like a typical subject, your estimate fell in the range 0.7 to 0.8 [even
though the answer is] 0.97. (Edwards 1980 [1968] AQ3
¶
, 361)
The conservatism of responses depends on the ‘diagnosticity’ of the stimulus. Diagnosticity refers
to the extent to which a given item of data can answer the question being posed (Wells and Luus
1990: 511). In other words, it depends on the extent to which the stimulus differs from the benchmark
estimate. Since the benchmark estimate is 0.5, the more unequal the distribution of the random
sample of chips, the more helpful that particular sample will be in deciding which bag is predomi-
nantly red. In the example above, the greater the surplus of reds over blues, the more conservative
the reaction. Crucially, at low levels of diagnosticity, that is, when the new information only suggests a
subtle change to the original estimate, subjects do not respond conservatively. Instead, they over-
react. When the sample of chips suggests a probability of 0.55 that this is the predominantly red
bag, which was hardly any change on the starting point of 0.5, respondents over-weighted the
new information (Edwards 1980 [1968], 364–5).
Subjects eventually arrive at the right probability, but only after two to ﬁve as many observations
as required by a fully rational actor (Edwards 1980 [1968], 359). Conservatism has also been demon-
strated when reacting to more complex social stimuli (Zuroff 1989: 894, Fiedler 1991). Training
reduces, but by no means eliminates, the tendency towards conservatism (Messick and Campos
1972: 336). In the context of ﬁnancial markets, this delay is termed under-reaction because the
initial price change is too small:
Conservatism ﬁts the under-reaction story well. Investors subject to conservatism might disregard the full infor-
mation content of [a public] announcement because they tend to cling, at least partially, to their prior estimates of
earnings rather than update their estimates based on the new information contained in the… announcement.
(Choi and Kim 2001: 1)
In spite of initial considerable controversy, a large literature tends towards the conclusion that
ﬁnancial markets generally under-react to public information on a timescale greater than a day
and less than a year (De Bondt and Thaler 1985, Fama 1998, Shefrin 2002, Lasfer et al. 2003).
Figure 1 depicts the difference between the EMH and under-reaction in relation to a price-relevant
event.
Elections are a good test of rational and quasi-rational theories as the results are both public and
well publicised. By contrast, much of government formation happens in secret negotiations between
parties. Publicity is a condition of the EMH of immediate incorporation of new information. It is also
necessary for the analogy to experiments in which subjects receive identical information. Sovereign
bonds are the asset most directly associated with government policy. Decisions to borrow and to
repay debts are inescapably political (Tomz 2007, Stasavage 2011) and the debt market inﬂuences
the fates of politicians and regimes (DiGiuseppe and Shea 2015 AQ4
¶
).
Comparative politics
In this section, we discuss the uneven inﬂuence of the psychological literature on heuristics and
biases on political science, in particular noting its relative absence in political science in general
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 3
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
and comparative democracy in particular. In spite of this lacuna, we argue that there is an appealing
ﬁt between comparative politics and psychological biases in decision-making and that it can produce
interesting and testable hypotheses. Thus, as well as presenting our hypotheses, we also establish
their originality. At our most general, we concentrate on the two speciﬁc literatures of the heuristics
and biases school from psychology and economics and the comparative democracy literature from
politics. Of course, we acknowledge the massive inﬂuence of psychology on a whole swathe of topics
in political science.
The study of comparative democratic institutions reﬂects the dominance of new institutionalism
over the last four decades. It is famous for its many warring varieties. Sociological, historical (Hall and
Taylor 1996) and discursive institutionalists (Hay 2005 AQ5
¶
) have been, often rightly, critical of the rational
choice approach for abstracting from the normative and historical contexts that give institutions their
meaning and much of their power to structure behaviour. The strength of this critique, of course,
varies according to the research problem at hand. We see at least two reasons why these thick, quali-
tative institutionalisms are less appropriate for studying ﬁnancial market reactions to elections in
different countries. If bond markets were national, they might be embedded in institutional norms
and cultures. By contrast, they are international and investors are therefore not always, or even
usually, socialised into the culture of the country whose bonds they are trading. Moreover, investors
are not politicians, nor are they often political specialists. Their interest in the politics of a speciﬁc
country tends to be ﬂeeting. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the EMH has been assumed
by almost all studies of ﬁnancial market reactions to political developments. However, the speed
and globalisation of markets do not undermine a behavioural approach. The quick and rare calcu-
lations made by markets on the basis of politics make it likely that market participants are likely to
resort to heuristics or will not have the time to battle strong psychological biases. Indeed, some inter-
esting recent research suggests that investors group countries together in regional or stereotypical
categories that are not justiﬁed by ﬁnancial and economic data (Gray 2013, Brooks et al. 2014 AQ6
¶
, Brazys
and Hardiman 2015).
However, there does not appear to be much, or even any, research on how psychological biases
interact with comparative political institutions. Therefore, it goes without saying that there has been
little or no research on how psychological biases might inﬂuence ﬁnancial market reactions to elec-
tions conditional on political institutions. In spite of the suitability of behavioural economics to our
subject, the absence of an extant literature is not only explained by the appropriateness and domi-
nance of the EMH. The introduction of ideas from psychology to economics was a major challenge to
some of the core assumptions of that discipline. Many of the ideas and methods of behavioural econ-
omics have found their way into political science. However, this route into political science reﬂects
Figure 1. Predictions of the EMH and conservatism.
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the microeconomic basis of much of behavioural economics and the methodology of psychology.
Behavioural economists have used psychological insights to reorient game theory and experimental
tests of its conclusions, and political scientists have revelled in similar opportunities (Wilson 2011,
Duch et al. 2014 AQ7
¶
). Indeed, this reﬂects psychology’s long-standing commitment to the interplay
between theory and careful experimentation. Behavioural economists have been much keener on
leaving the lab. The elite and popular hit Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) exempliﬁes its profound
inﬂuence on thinking about public policy. The laboratory is a new and exciting prospect for political
scientists, but the insights of the heuristics and biases literature are now joining older psychological
inspiration in core political science concerns such as electoral studies (Bendor et al. 2011) and political
economy (Mosley 2003, Brooks et al. 2015). Nevertheless, this set of ideas has yet to engage substan-
tially with the massive literature on comparative democracy.
We follow the fruitful approach of the behavioural economists by beginning with the canonical
literature on our topic and deriving new hypotheses by introducing psychological bias where
there was previously an efﬁcient market. We mean comparative democracy in a highly speciﬁc
sense, but one which is perhaps dominant in the literature. We refer to approaches that summarise
the differences and similarities between the political institutions of established democracies. This
question is studied in two ways: one institution-centred and another actor-centred. The former
focuses on important rules such as presidentialism versus parliamentarism (Cheibub et al. 2014)
and majoritarian versus proportional representation electoral systems (Gallagher and Mitchell
2005). While it can be argued that speciﬁc rules or institutions are logically linked to certain incentives
or behaviours, political systems are complex, and the interaction of institutions makes it difﬁcult to
make clear predictions (Ginsburg 2015: 109). Much of the institutional literature feeds into the
actor-centred approach, which argues that the major differences between democracies can be sum-
marised by differences in the number of relevant actors, or more rigorously, the number of veto
players (Henisz 2000 AQ8
¶
, Powell 2000, Armingeon 2002, Keefer and Stasavage 2002
AQ9
¶
, Tsebelis 2002, Lij-
phart 2012). The genesis of Lijphart’s classiﬁcation dates back to his monograph on the Netherlands
published in the 1968 (Lijphart 1968), but remains central to political science debates today (Colomer
2006: 224, Ganghof 2010). Its main challenger has been the veto-players theory of Tsebelis (McGann
and Latner 2012 AQ10
¶
), which nevertheless shares a concern with counting actors instead of naming insti-
tutions and a prediction that the larger the number of actors, the more difﬁcult it is to make policy
changes. Lijphart coined the useful distinction between consensual and majoritarian democracies
(Lijphart 2012). Systems with many relevant actors are commonly called ‘consensual’ because
decisions typically require a consensus beyond a plurality or a majority and those with few relevant
actors are termed ‘majoritarian’ because a majority can usually take most signiﬁcant decisions
without further bargaining or consultation. The UK, where the prime minister and cabinet tradition-
ally dominated the political system, was the archetype of majoritarianism. By contrast, in consensual
Switzerland, the government consists of several parties and the executive must take into account the
legislature, as well as the cantons, and citizen referenda.
The veto-players approach of Tsebelis begins with the same intuition that the number of relevant
decision-makers is the vital dimension in distinguishing between stable democracies. The notion of a
veto player is easier to identify reliably; works well for both presidential and parliamentary systems
and allows the application of game theory to policy-making. Indeed, Tsebelis began with variations
in policy stability and worked his way backwards to veto players (Tsebelis 2002: 6). Here we use the
term consensual to denote a political system with relatively many veto players and majoritarianism to
denote a system with relatively few veto players. Research on the advantages and disadvantages of
different patterns of democracy initially tended to focus not only on democratic accountability and
representation, but also on general socio-economic outcomes such as inequality and economic
growth as well as policies in speciﬁc sectors (Hall and Soskice 2001 AQ11
¶
, McMenamin 2004, Koss 2011,
Szakonyi and Urpelainen 2013). This includes banking as credit-based ﬁnancial systems have been
associated with consensual politics and stock-market-based ﬁnance has been associated with major-
itarianism (Zysman 1983, Howarth and Quaglia 2015: 459–61).
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Majoritarian elections provide more information than consensual elections in terms of policy-
making, the identity of the new government and the speed of government formation. Policy-
making in majoritarian countries is dominated by a powerful government, whereas in a consensus
system the government is constrained by other actors. Under majoritarianism, the election deter-
mines the new government, but in a consensus democracy the coalition government often does
not reﬂect the election result. In a majoritarian country, the identity of the new government is
obvious when the election result is known. By contrast, in consensus democracies coalition formation
can continue for weeks or months.
These three differences underpin the hypothesis that the less constrained the political system, the
greater the impact of the election on prices in a rational market. This analysis is very reminiscent of
research on how political institutions can condition accountability and voter behaviour (Powell and
Whitten 1993, Anderson 2000, Whitten and Williams 2015 AQ12
¶
). Indeed, the existing literature on ﬁnancial
markets and elections presents arguments about how differences in political institutions can explain
variations in uncertainty about, and associated with, market volatility (Hays et al. 2003: 209–10, Bern-
hard and Leblang 2006, Goldbach and Fahrholz 2011, Philips 2014). Earlier research on the impact of
partisanship (Herron 2000) has been supplemented by research which shows that institutions
mediate the impact of partisan shifts (Bechtel 2009, Campello 2013, Sattler 2013). This is consistent
with other strands of political economy research that emphasise the importance of credible commit-
ments by policy-makers (North and Weingast 1989, Hallerberg et al. 2009, Saeigh 2009, Breen and
McMenamin 2013). This is the also the theoretical basis of the much-debated ‘democratic advantage’
in the sovereign debt market (Biglaiser and Staats 2012, DiGiuseppe and Shea 2015).
We go further and derive a hypothesis from the synthesis of comparative politics and the conser-
vatism bias. We are not aware of any other attempt to do this. Psychological research has demon-
strated that ‘as diagnosticity increases, conservatism increases also’ (Edwards 1980 [1968], 364). In
other words, the more informative the event, the greater should be the under-reaction. The issue
bond markets are trying to diagnose is the extent to which an election will inﬂuence the value of
the country’s sovereign bond. An election in a majoritarian country is more informative about the
value of its government bond than an election in a consensual country. Therefore, the less con-
strained the political system, the greater the predicted under-reaction. In consensual countries, elec-
tions often provide only very indistinct cues about possible changes in public policy and informed
observers will know that change is rare and slow in consensus democracies. Indeed, in highly consen-
sual systems, as in experiments with stimuli of low diagnosticity, there should be no under-reaction.
Table 1 summarises our hypotheses.
Similarly to our theory, our methodology combines techniques from ﬁnance and political science
that are described in the next section.
Methodology
We estimate the impact of elections on bond yields using the classic, or ﬁnance, event-study meth-
odology (Corrado 2011: 220, Sandler and Sandler 2012 AQ13
¶
: 3). We do not measure simple changes in
yields before and after elections. Instead, the essence of this technique is to posit the counterfactual:
the yield of the bond if the election had not happened. In event studies, this is known as the normal
return. Abnormal return, then, is the difference between the actual yield and the normal return. We
establish a normal return by regressing the yield of the bond in question on the yield for US and
German bonds (Brazys and Hardiman 2015: 32). These are regarded as the safest and most liquid
Table 1. Hypotheses.
Finance Comparative politics
Rational 1. New information incorporated immediately 3. Greater impact in majoritarian countries
Quasi-rational 2. New information incorporated slowly: under-reaction 4. Greater under-reaction in majoritarian countries
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bonds and exert a very strong inﬂuence over the market for bonds from other countries. Some event
studies use more variables to predict the normal return (Bechtel and Schneider 2010 AQ14
¶
). However,
Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay observe that extra factors tend to add little to the model’s predictive
performance (Campbell et al. 1996 AQ15
¶
: 151). Bond yields are non-stationary in that they tend to drift
away from the mean over time. In order to ensure that our data are stationary, we use the ﬁrst differ-
ence of the interest rates. So, the estimation equation for each election is
Dyt = a+ b1DUSt + b2DGERt + ut. (1)
The period for which we regress the bond of interest on its American and German counterparts is
called the estimation window. For each election in our data set, the estimation window consists of the
period between one month and six months before the election. This amounts to 100 trading days in
most cases. We exclude the last month before the election to reduce contamination from the cam-
paign. Our counterfactual needs to reﬂect a period of normal politics, rather than one of intense cam-
paigning, frequent polling and speculation about the result and its consequences. We then cumulate
the abnormal returns day by day to get the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Comparison of CARs in
the days after the election allows us to test the EMH versus the conservatism hypothesis. Following
the ﬁnance literature, we assume the ‘correct’ reaction to be that at which the market stabilises, that
is, t + n. Therefore, we can calculate the percentage under-reaction as
Under - reactiont = CARt+n − CARtCARt+n
( )
∗100. (2)
We estimate the CAR using daily yields on 10-year benchmark bonds from Datastream (Kuttner
and Posen 2010 AQ16
¶
: 360). Benchmark bonds are the latest issue, so there is no problem with time to
maturity. Ten-year bonds tend to be the most liquid and, therefore, the quickest to react to new infor-
mation. Moreover, they reﬂect the market’s view of a government better than short-term interest
rates, which are driven by the interest rate policies of central banks. Many studies use credit
default swaps. Unfortunately, they are a relatively recent innovation and anyway there is very little
variation for rich countries like those we study. For some countries, we lengthen the time series some-
what by using another long-term bond that we can show correlates at over 0.97 with the benchmark
bond. Due to constraints on the availability of a time series of benchmark bonds, our sample consists
of Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The earliest election is 1975
(Switzerland) and there are several in 2007. Later elections are excluded due to the absence of ideol-
ogy measures. There are 12 Australian elections (due to three-year parliamentary terms and early
adoption of a benchmark bond) and only 4 for Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (late availability
of benchmark bonds). Full details are contained in the appendix. We exclude the USA because no
other country’s bond can predict its interest rate and because the candidate-centred elections in
its presidential system are very different from the party-centred legislative election in our other
cases. The USA is the only regressor for Germany3 and for two Swiss elections, which predate Ger-
many’s benchmark bond. The mean R2 of the estimation equations is 0.34.
We are not interested in market sentiment in relation to elections, but rather the magnitude and
speed of their reaction. Therefore, we use the absolute CAR as our dependent variable. We employ
several variables to explain variation in the impact of elections. The ﬁrst is political constraints, which
measures the ‘extent to which a change in preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in gov-
ernment policy’ (Henisz 2002: 363). Speciﬁcally, we use POLCONIII which is restricted to the executive
and legislative branches, the control of which is contested in elections. In contrast to the CHECKS vari-
able from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, the addition of further veto players pro-
vides a diminishing increase in the level of constraints. We hypothesise that the less constrained the
political system, the greater is the impact of the election and greater is the under-reaction to the elec-
tion. However, psychological experiments have shown that this relationship changes at low levels of
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diagnosticity, that is, where the new information is not so useful in answering the question at issue. In
other words, the effect is non-linear. In order to test for this, we include the square of political con-
straints, too. To proxy the extent to which the election result is a surprise, we measure the closeness
of the election. Since the number of parties varies across our elections, we need a ﬂexible measure of
closeness. We use the competitiveness index (Endersby et al. 2002: 614–15). Close elections should be
associated with greater impacts since the result is less likely to have been anticipated and ‘priced in’.
Next we proxy the amount of political change produced by the election. To do so, we measure the
change in the ideological composition of the lower house of the legislature, that is, the one to which
the government is responsible. Our ideological measure comes from the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP). Expert surveys have some important advantages as measures of party ideology.
However, the CMP has vastly better coverage of our country-election observations. We use RILE AQ17
¶(Budge et al. 2001: 21), a well-known measure of the left–right position of parties; weight it by the
parties’ seat shares and enter changes in this variable in our data set. Since our dependent variable
is the absolute CAR and we are not testing for direction, we use the absolute value of ideological
change, whether to the right or the left. Finally, there is a dummy for weekend elections because
that indicates a rather different informational environment from a weekday election. Investors will
have had more time to process the news about the election. Media reports when trading begins
will be less prominent, more considered and more accurate than those for weekday elections.
In our main analysis, we do not include economic controls, as there are no announcements in
relation to these variables over the event window. To include macroeconomic indicators would be
to mix levels of analysis. Normal return already contains the market’s evaluation of available econ-
omic and ﬁscal data. In Appendix 2, we show that the main macroeconomic variables neither
predict the absolute CAR, nor substantially change the effect of our political variables. We also con-
sidered whether liquidity inﬂuenced patterns of under-reaction. The smaller the absolute debt of a
country, the less liquid is its government bond. Therefore, where the debt is smaller and more
thinly traded, investors may not have the opportunity to immediately take into account new infor-
mation. This hypothesis is also rejected in the appendix. It is plausible that our political variables
do not capture all country-speciﬁc effects; so, in Appendix 3, we ran our analyses with dummy vari-
ables for countries and Australia as the reference category. While some of the country dummies are
signiﬁcant, our basic results stay the same. Finally, we tested whether the direction of ideological
change affected our results. Appendix 4 shows that it did not. Table 2 summarises our dependent
and political variables.
Since the dependent variable is an absolute value, we need a model that will predict a minimum of
zero. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and OLS with a logged dependent variable are unsuitable for this
sort of data (King 1988: 839). We use a Poisson regression, with standard errors clustered by country.
Poisson models were originally designed for count data and are common in international relations,
where the counting of conﬂicts is a major research programme (Bremer 1992). It is not essential for a
Poisson model to have a dependent variable in the form of a count if robust standard errors are used
(Wooldrige 2010: 728). Our data meet the assumptions of the Poisson model. The variance of the
dependent variables is less than the mean. A comparison with a negative binomial model suggested
no problem with overdispersion. Indeed, the models were virtually indistinguishable. Goodness-of-ﬁt
tests also gave us no reason to think that the Poisson model was inappropriate. We study short-term
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Absolute CAR (day 1) 0.051 0.081 0 0.631
Absolute CAR (day 15) 0.164 0.199 0.0005 0.978
Political constraints 0.487 0.096 0.249 0.718
Closeness 0.194 0.193 0.0006 0.94
Abs. ideological change 1.444 1.307 0.019 6.176
Weekend election 0.7 0.46 0 1
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reactions to events that are years apart. Therefore, there is no potential for autocorrelation. The com-
parative equation for election i on day t is written as follows:
|CARit| = exp(a+ b1Constraintsi + b2Constraints2i + b3Closenessi + b4Ideological Changei
+ b5Weekendi + uit). (3)
Results
In order to test the EMH against under-reaction, Figure 2 simply plots the evolution of the absolute
CAR in the days after the election for the full sample. We present a three-week window because, as
will be shown later, the impact of our main independent variable stabilises within this time frame.4
The size of the impact grows steeply in the ﬁrst week; brieﬂy dips at the beginning of the second
week and thereafter continues to mount, albeit more slowly. The under-reaction implied by the
data is 69 per cent: the impact on day one is 31 per cent of the impact on day 15. This graph is
very reminiscent of many ﬁgures from the ﬁnance literature on various types of stock market
announcements (Bernard and Thomas 1989: 3, 10, 12, 13, Kadiyala and Rau 2004: 374, Spyros et al.
2007 AQ18
¶
: 228–9). According to the EMH, there should be an immediate price change followed by
price stability. The data clearly favour quasi-rational markets over the EMH.
Model 1 in Table 3 presents results for the day after the election in the whole sample, while Model
2 uses the same independent variables to explain the CAR on day 15. The coefﬁcient on political con-
straints is negative in both equations, signifying lower impacts in more constrained political systems
as predicted by hypothesis three. We can also see preliminary evidence for hypothesis four: the coef-
ﬁcient on political constraints doubles in size across the three trading weeks. This indicates that the
difference between the majoritarian and consensual systems grows over time. In other words,
markets initially under-reacted to the difference between the political systems. The coefﬁcient on
the square of political constraints also increases. As happened in the psychological experiments,
the observations with very low ‘diagnosticity’, those that do not provide much price-relevant infor-
mation, modify the relationship between political constraints and market reactions. However, since
we are testing a quadratic relationship, it is not advisable to interpret the coefﬁcients and associated
signiﬁcance tests. Instead, we derived marginal predictions according to values of political constraints
and jointly tested the signiﬁcance of political constraints and its square. Figure 3 plots the marginal
predictions of political constraints for day one in a solid line. As predicted by hypothesis three, and
consistent with a substantial literature, the more constrained the political system, the lower the
Figure 2. Under-reaction in government bond interest rates after elections.
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Table 3. Predicting the impact (absolute CAR) of elections using Poisson regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Day 1 15 1 15 1 15
Sample All All Excluding euro Excluding euro Excluding cointegration Excluding cointegration
Political constraints −6.368047
(9.057793)
−12.70493
(8.115724)
−8.576438
(9.128136)
−15.29428
(8.725651)+
−7.053033
(10.02614)
−11.31342
(8.306493)
Political constraints squared 3.575616
(9.316015)
9.367309
(8.735514)
6.948496
(9.871246)
13.25537
(9.62682)
4.341634
(10.46194)
8.023945
(9.053475)
Closeness of elections 0.0683664
(0.4945046)
0.0343279
(0.4864681)
0.0354337
(0.5353441)
0.0006101
(0.4497953)
−0.163555
(0.5718714)
−0.190405
(0.4925873)
Ideological change 0.181336
(0.0853064)*
0.1791478
(0.0859494)*
0.1848958
(0.0960001)+
0.1856448
(0.0814111)*
0.1987234
(0.0931497)*
0.1951435
(0.0729726)**
Weekend −0.4616264
(0.347301)
−0.4335055
(0.2083802)*
−0.4225007
(0.3421203)
−0.4029658
(0.2106706)
−0.4685671
(0.3963055)
−0.3658409
(0.2369167)
Constant −0.9060004
(2.046471)
1.972568
(1.818886)
−0.5038624
(1.960406)
2.433452
(1.872623)
−0.679202
(2.197392)
1.689478
(1.823668)
Wald χ2 22.64** 27.76** 29.38** 28.13** 22.13** 28.02**
Observations 122 122 97 97 101 101
Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%.
**Signiﬁcant at 1%.
+Signiﬁcant at 10%.
10
I.M
C
M
EN
A
M
IN
ET
A
L.
455
460
465
470
475
480
485
490
495
500
impact of the election on the price of the government’s bond. However, the relationship is weak and
statistically insigniﬁcant, so this cannot be counted as evidence for hypothesis three that markets
react rationally and immediately to differences in the volume of information produced by elections,
according to the number of relevant actors in the political system.
The same relationship is plotted in a broken line for day 15. Now the effect is very strong and sig-
niﬁcant at 1 per cent. There is also a much stronger curve to the line, with the impact decreasing at
higher levels, and actually reversing very slightly for the most constrained observations in our sample.
The really interesting aspect of this graph is that the gap between the impact for day 1 and day 15
decreases with political constraints. This is a measure of under-reaction. It is easy to see that there is a
much bigger difference between the initial and the eventual reaction for unconstrained political
systems. The implied under-reaction for a political constraints score of 0.25 is 42 per cent, while
for a score of 0.69 it is 6.7 per cent. For 0.71, the under-reaction is slightly larger at almost 6.9 per
cent. Appendix 5 notes the coefﬁcients on political constraints and its square as well as a test for
the joint signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients for all 15 days. The coefﬁcients are volatile in the ﬁrst
week, with a range of 16 for political constraints and 18 for its square. By contrast, thereafter the coef-
ﬁcients are quite stable. For the succeeding two weeks, the range on political constraints is six and
constraints squared has a range of eight. Thus, we interpret the results at the end of this three-week
period as the eventual impact of the election. Sometimes event studies are used to calculate long-
term impacts. We think the event study is a short-term technique. The longer the event window,
the less likely it is that the estimation window establishes a good counterfactual and the more
likely it is that events other than the one under investigation drive the CAR.
The constant captures much of the under-reaction as it increases from −0.9 on day 1 to 1.97 on
day 15. The other two political variables are also in the predicted direction. The closeness of the elec-
tion has little impact on day 1. However, the coefﬁcient increases massively on day 2. It is between 18
and 20 times bigger than on the ﬁrst day for the next seven days and signiﬁcant at 1 per cent. There-
after, it gradually decreases and loses statistical signiﬁcance. Indeed, on day 14, the coefﬁcient turns
negative. This suggests that markets initially over-react to close elections. Ideological change displays
a more stable pattern than political constraints or closeness. It is always in the predicted direction and
the size of the coefﬁcients is relatively stable, except for a dip on days 2 and 3. The mean of 0.17 is not
appreciably different from the impact on the ﬁrst day. The statistical signiﬁcance of AQ19
¶
the coefﬁcients
does vary considerably: four days at 1 per cent, six days at 5 per cent, one at 10 per cent; and four are
insigniﬁcant.
Figure 3. Under-reaction and political constraints. Note: Adjusted predictions for levels of political constraints from models 1 and 2
in Table N AQ30
¶
, holding all other variables at their mean.
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Columns four to seven present robustness checks to one substantive and one statistical issue. The
substantive issue is the euro. Government policy can affect the value of bonds through two principal
mechanisms: default risk and inﬂation risk (Rommerskirchen 2015). Evidently, the advent of the euro
fundamentally altered the nature of both in the countries that adopted it. Ambiguity about how the
euro had affected default risk featured prominently in the recent crisis. Inﬂation is more straightfor-
ward. Euro member governments now have little or no control over the value of the currency in
which their debt is dominated. We removed all Eurozone elections since 1999. The statistical issue
is co-integration. The estimation equations for 17 per cent of our elections showed evidence of
co-integration,5 that is, when two or more non-stationary variables move together over time. Since
this is a property of a minority of our observations, it was appropriate to proceed with ﬁrst-differ-
enced OLS. However, to be sure this issue is not affecting our conclusions, we dropped the co-inte-
grated observations and ran the regressions again. The contrast between day 1 and day 15 in the
whole sample is clearly echoed in the equations (models 4–6 of Table 3) that exclude the euro
and co-integrated observations. Table 4 computes under-reaction, derived frommarginal predictions,
for each sample. The sample that removes co-integration is virtually indistinguishable from the whole
sample. The sample that excludes the euro predicts noticeably more under-reaction. However, the
range across sample values of political constraints is almost the same. These robustness tests do
not qualify our conclusion. If anything, they present stronger results. In principle, our independent
variables should interact with each other. Empirically, such interactions cause problems with multi-
collinearity, but have little impact on the implied impact of political institutions on under-reaction.
Therefore, we do not report interaction effects.
We can now summarise the evidence in relation to our hypotheses. Hypothesis one, the EMH, is
not a good description of bond market reactions to elections. Instead, the data support hypothesis
two: markets under-react to elections, consistent with psychological experiments on conservatism
and ﬁnance research on equities. Hypothesis three was that markets embrace the comparative poli-
tics distinction between elections in consensual andmajoritarian countries. Consistent with the broad
approach of much of political economy, the bond markets tend to react more strongly to elections in
majoritarian countries, but the evidence that they do so immediately is weak. Most interestingly,
hypothesis four is also consistent with the evidence. Political institutions explain variations in
under-reaction. Markets tend to under-react to elections in majoritarian countries more than they
do to elections in more constrained polities.
Conclusions
This article has presented a theoretical synthesis of comparative politics with both the rational-actor
model of mainstream economics and the quasi-rational actor of psychology. It has also shown how
combinations of comparative politics with psychology and traditional economics, respectively, can
be tested against each other in a single empirical framework. The empirical tests produced deﬁnite
and interesting results. The brute impact of elections on government bonds favours the psychological
theory of conservatism over the EMH. In the weeks after an election, markets continue to register an
increased reaction to the election result. Rational actors should incorporate new information immedi-
ately. Instead, the observed under-reaction is consistent with psychological experiments, which show
that humans are slow to update previously held opinions. Our ﬁnding that variation in the strength of
this psychological bias can be explained by variation in democratic political institutions is a new one.
Financial markets are information-rich and a most likely case for rational action and were an
Table 4. Comparison of under-reaction (%) across samples.
Political constraints Full sample Excluding euro Excluding cointegration
0.25 42 47 42
0.69 6.7 12 7
0.71 6.9 13 7
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appropriate test for our theory. Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine further applications: does public
opinion also under-react more to new information from less constrained political systems?
While we think that our ﬁndings are primarily interesting from an academic point of view, they also
have interesting implications for politicians, ﬁnance professionals, journalists and citizens. The impact
of elections onﬁnancialmarkets is usually reportedon thedayof the results, notweeks afterwards. There-
fore, it appears that, acting under the assumption of an immediate reaction, we are substantially under-
estimating the impact of elections. Moreover, if we are underestimating the reaction of markets to
elections, then we are probably also underestimating the extent to which markets constrain and con-
dition political choice (Rommerskirchen 2015, Leerse and Seelkopf 2016). Of course, elections are not
the only, or even the most important, political effect on ﬁnancial markets. Budgets (McMenamin et al.
2015) and government formation are two other processes that come to mind. However, the precise
timing of public information release about these two is much harder to identify. Moreover, as the prin-
cipal mechanism of representative democracy, elections have an obvious normative importance.
There is also very strong evidence that ﬁnancial markets understand comparative politics quite well.
In general, they are not plagued by uncertainty and can use basic political information to calculate risk.
They do not need to resort to heuristics. Each of our three political variables is consistently in the right
direction. Ideological change and the closeness of the election are somewhat weak and/or volatile
depending on how many days after the election the analysis is conducted. The most subtle variable,
political constraints, is strong and consistent. The idea that policy change is more difﬁcult in constrained
political systems is a staple of comparative politics. A clear corollary is that elections in constrained poli-
ties should have less impact on asset prices. The synthesis of comparative politics and the EMH receives
substantial support. Finally, our models also explain variations in under-reaction. We ﬁnd that the fewer
the political constraints, the greater the under-reaction. This conclusion is consistent with a series of
classic psychological experiments and much of the literature on behavioural ﬁnance. The literature
on comparative democracy has proven its worth to political economists in recent decades (Persson
and Tabellini 2005). Our research suggests that it can also be enlightening for psychologists. Of
course, this also means that there is an opportunity for political scientists to combine psychological the-
ories and ﬁnancial econometrics in their own work on patterns of democracy.
Notes
1. The uncertain information hypothesis (Brown et al. 1988) generates different predictions from a rationalist per-
spective. Since it is a less prominent theory and receives no support from our data, we do not elaborate it here.
2. Bounded rationality includes consideration of limited information and time, as well as cognitive limitations
(Simon 1955). We study only the latter.
3. We exclude Germany because we cannot have identical dependent and independent variables.
4. There is no theoretical approach to the identiﬁcation of the event window, so we follow others in adopting an
empirical approach (Bølstad and Elhardt 2015: 9).
5. We conducted the Engle and Granger (1987) test for co-integration using the critical values of McKinnon (2010).
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Anderson, Christopher J. (2000), ‘Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative Perspective’, Electoral Studies, 19,
pp. 151–70.
Armingeon, Klaus (2002), ‘The Effects of Negotiation Democracy: A Comparative Analysis’, European Journal of Political
Research, 41 (1), pp. 81–105.
Baldacci, Emanuele and Kumar, Manhoman S. (2010), Fiscal Deﬁcits, Public Debt, and Sovereign Bond Yields, IMF Working
Paper WP/10/184.
Bechtel, Michael (2009), ‘The Political Sources of Systemic Investment Risk: Lessons from a Consensus Democracy’, The
Journal of Politics, 71 (2), pp. 661–77.
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 13
605
610
615
620
625
630
635
640
645
650
Bendor, Jonathan, et al. (2011), A Behavioral Theory of Elections (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Bernard, Victor L. and Thomas, Jacob K. (1989), ‘Post-earnings Announcement Drift: Delayed Price Response or Risk
Premium’, Journal of Accounting Research, 27, pp. 1–36.
Bernhard, William and Leblang, David (2006), Democratic Processes and Financial Markets: Pricing Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Biglaiser, Glen and Staats, Joseph L. (2012), ‘Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The
Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law’, International Organization, 66 (3),
pp. 515–35.
Bølstad, Jørgen and Elhardt, Christoph (2015), ‘To Bail Out or Not to Bail Out? Crisis Politics, Credibility, and Default Risk in
the Eurozone’, European Union Politics. AQ20
¶Brazys, Samuel and Hardiman, Niamh (2015), ‘From ‘Tiger’ to ‘PIIGS’: Ireland and the Use of Heuristics in Comparative
Political Economy’, European Journal of Political Research, 54, pp. 23–42.
Breen, Michael and McMenamin, Iain (2013), ‘Political Institutions, Credible Commitment, and Sovereign Debt in
Advanced Economies’, International Studies Quarterly, 57 (4), pp. 842–54.
Bremer, Stuart (1992), ‘Dangerous Dyads’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 44 (5), pp. 653–85.
Brooks, Sarah, Cunha, Raphael and Mosley, Layna (2015), ‘Categories, Creditworthiness, and Contagion: How Investors’
Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets’, International Studies Quarterly, 59 (3), pp. 587–601.
Brown, Keith C., Harlow, W.V. and Tinic, Seha M. (1988), ‘Risk Aversion, Uncertain Information and Market Efﬁciency’,
Journal of Financial Economics, 22, pp. 355–85.
Budge, Ian, et al. (2001), Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments: 1945–1998 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Campbell, John Y., Lo, Andrew W. and Mackinlay, Craig (1996), The Econometrics of Financial Markets (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press).
Campello, Daniela (2013), Globalization and Democracy: The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Cheibub, José Antonio, Elkins, Zachary and Ginsburg, Tom (2014), ‘Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism’, British
Journal of Political Science, 44 (3), pp. 515–44.
Choi, Wonseok and Kim, Jung-Wook (2001), Underreaction, Trading Volume, and Post-earnings Announcement Drift.
Available from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=287817
Colomer, Josep M. (2006), ‘Comparative Constitutions’, in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder and Bert A. Rockman (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 217–39.
Corrado, Charles J. (2011), ‘Event Studies: A Methodological Review’, Accounting and Finance, 51 (1), pp. 207–34.
DeBondt,Werner andThaler, Richard (1985), ‘Does the StockMarketOverreact?’, The Journal of Finance, 40 (3), pp. 793–805.
Duch, Raymond, Przepiorka, Wojtek and Stevenson, Randolph (2014), ‘Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision
Makers’, American Journal of Political Science, 59 (2), pp. 372–89.
Edwards, Ward (1980) [1968], ‘Conservatism in Human Information Processing’, in Daniel Kahnemann, Paul Slovic and
Amos Tversky (eds), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
pp. 359–69.
Endersby, James W., Galatas, Steven E. and Rackaway, Chapman B. (2002), ‘Closeness Counts in Canada: Voter
Participation in the 1993 and 1997 Federal Elections’, The Journal of Politics, 64 (2), pp. 610–31.
Engle, R.F. and Granger, C.W.J. (1987), ‘Co-integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation and Testing’,
Econometrica, 55, pp. 251–76.
Fama, E. (1970), ‘Efﬁcient Capital Markets: A Reviewof Theory and EmpiricalWork’, The Journal of Finance, 25 (2), pp. 383–417.
Fama, E. (1998), ‘Market Efﬁciency, Long-term Returns, and Behavioral Finance’, Journal of Financial Economics, 49, pp.
283–306.
Fiedler, Klaus (1991), ‘The Tricky Nature of Skewed Frequency Tables: An Information Loss Account of Distinctiveness-
based Illusory Correlations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60 (1), pp. 24–36.
Gallagher, Michael and Mitchell, Paul, eds. (2005), The Politics of Electoral Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Ganghof, Steffen (2010), ‘Democratic Inclusiveness: A Reinterpretation of Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy’, British Journal
of Political Science, 40, pp. 679–92.
Ginsburg, Tom (2015), ‘Constitutions as Political Institutions’, in Jennifer Gandhi and Rubén Ruiz-Ruino (eds), The
Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions (London: Routledge). AQ21
¶Goldbach, R. and Fahrholz, C. (2011), ‘The Euro Area’s Common Default Risk: Evidence on the Commission’s Impact on
European Fiscal Affairs’, European Union Politics, 12 (4), pp. 507–28.
Gray, Julia (2013), The Company States Keep: International Economic Organization and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Markets
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Hall, Peter A. and Taylor, Rosemary (1996), ‘Political Science and the ThreeNew Institutionalisms’, Political Studies, 44, pp. 936–57.
Hallerberg, Mark, Strauch, Rolf Rainer and von Hagen, Juergen (2009), Fiscal Governance in Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Hay, Colin (2005), ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’, in Rod Rhodes, Sarah Binder and Bert Rockman (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 56–74.
14 I. MCMENAMIN ET AL.
655
660
665
670
675
680
685
690
695
700
Hays, J., Freeman, J. and Nesseth, H. (2003), ‘Exchange Rate Volatility and Democratization in Emerging Market Countries’,
International Studies Quarterly, 47 (2), pp. 203–28.
Henisz, Witold (2002), ‘The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 11
(2), pp. 335–89.
Herron, Michael (2000), ‘Estimating the Economic Impact of Political Party Competition in the 1992 British Election’,
American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2), pp. 326–37.
Hilbert, Martin (2012), ‘Towards a Synthesis of Cognitive Biases: How Noisy Information Processes Can Bias Human
Decision Making’, Psychological Bulletin, 138 (2), pp. 211–37.
Howarth, David and Quaglia, Lucy (2015), ‘The Political Economy of the Euro Area’s Sovereign Debt Crisis’, Review of
International Political Economy, 22 (3), pp. 457–84.
Kadiyala, Padmaja and Rau, P. Raghavendra (2004), ‘Investor Reaction to Corporate Event Announcements: Under-reac-
tion or Overreaction?’, The Journal of Business, 77 (2), pp. 357–86.
Kahneman, Daniel andTversky, Amos (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: AnAnalysis ofDecisionUnder Risk’, Econometrica, 7 (2), pp. 263–92 AQ22
¶
.
Keefer, Philip and Stasavage, David (2002), ‘The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the
Credibility of Monetary Policy’, American Political Science Review, 97 (3), pp. 407–23.
Keynes, John M. (1948) [1921], A General Treatise on Probability (New York: Macmillan).
King, Gary (1988), ‘Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in Conventional Procedures and Evidence for
the Exponential Poisson Model’, American Journal of Political Science, 32 (3), pp. 838–63.
Klossner, S., Becker, M. and Friedmann, R. (2012), ‘Modelling and Measuring Intraday Overreaction of Stock Prices’, Journal
of Banking and Finance, 36 (4), pp. 1152–63 AQ23
¶
.
Knight, Frank (1921), Risk, Uncertainty, and Proﬁt (New York: Houghton Mifﬂin).
Koss, Michael (2011), The Politics of Party Funding: State Funding to Political Parties and Party Competition in Western Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Lasfer, M.A., Melnik, A. and Thomas, D.C. (2003), ‘Short-term Reactions of Stock Markets in Stressful Circumstances’,
Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, pp. 1959–77.
Leerse, Hannah and Seerkopf, Laura (2016), ‘Room to Manoeuvre: International Financial Markets and the National Tax
State’, New Political Economy, 21 (1), pp. 145–65.
Lewis, Jeffrey B. and Linzer, Drew A. (2005), ‘Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable Is Based on
Estimates’, Political Analysis, 13, pp. 345–64 AQ24
¶
.
Lijphart, Arend (1968), The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of
California Press).
Lijphart, Arend (2012), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Democracies (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press).
Malkiel, BurtonG. (2003), ‘The EfﬁcientMarket Hypothesis and Its Critics’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (1), pp. 59–82.
McGann, Anthony J. and Latner, Michael (2015), ‘The Calculus of Consensus Democracy: Rethinking Patterns of Democracy
Without Veto Players’, Comparative Political Studies, 46 (7), pp. 823–50 AQ25
¶
.
McKinnon, James G. (2010), Critical Values for Cointegration Tests. Working Paper 1227. Economics Department, Queen’s
University.
McMenamin, Iain (2004), ‘Varieties of Capitalist Democracy: What Difference Does East-Central Europe Make?’, Journal of
Public Policy, 24 (3), pp. 259–74.
McMenamin, Iain, Breen, Michael and Muñoz-Portillo, Juan (2015), ‘Austerity and Credibility in the Eurozone’, European
Union Politics, 16 (1), pp. 45–66.
Messick, David and Campos, Francis (1972), ‘Training and Conservatism in Subjective Probability Revision’, Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 94 (3), pp. 335–37.
Mosley, Layna (2003), Global Capital and National Governments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Nelson, Stephen C. and Katzenstein, Peter J. (2014), ‘Uncertainty, Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2008’, International
Organization, 68 (2), pp. 361–92.
North, Douglass and Weingast, Barry (1989), ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing
Public Choice in Seventeenth-century England’, Journal of Economic History, 49 (4), pp. 803–32.
Paudyn, Bartholomew (2014), Credit Ratings and Sovereign Debt: The Political Economy of Creditworthiness Through Risk
and Uncertainty (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
Persson, Torben and Tabellini, Guido (2005), The Economic Effects of Constitutions (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press).
Philips, Lauren (2014), Reform and Volatility: The Political Sources of Financial Market Volatility in Brazil and Mexico, 1991–
2002 (London: London School of Economics and Political Science).
Powell, G. Bingham (2000), Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press).
Powell, G. Bingham and Whitten, Guy (1993), ‘A Cross-national Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of Political
Context’, American Journal of Political Science, 37 (2), pp. 391–414.
Rommerskirchen, Charlotte (Forthcoming), ‘Debt and Punishment:Market Discipline in the Eurozone’,New Political Economy AQ26
¶
.
Saiegh, Sebastian (2009), ‘Coalition Governments and Sovereign Debt Crises’, Economics and Politics, 21 (2), pp. 1342–56.
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 15
705
710
715
720
725
730
735
740
745
750
Sattler, Thomas (2013), ‘Do Markets Punish Left Governments?’, Journal of Politics, 75 (2), pp. 877–902.
Shefrin, Hersh (2002), Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Simon, Hebert (1955), ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1), pp. 99–118.
Spyrou, Spyros, Kassimatis, Konstantinos and Galariotis, Emilios (2004), ‘Short-term Overreaction, Under-reaction and
Efﬁcient Reaction: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange’, Applied Financial Economics, 17, pp. 221–35 AQ27
¶
.
Stasavage, David (2011), States of Credit: Size, Power, and the Development of European Polities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press).
Szakonyi, David and Urpelainen, Johannes (2013), ‘Veto Players and the Value of Political Control: A Theory with Evidence
from Energy Privatization’, Comparative Political Studies, 47, pp. 1384–415.
Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein, Cass R. (2008), Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
Tomz, Michael (2007), Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press).
Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Wells, Gary L. and Luus, C.A. Elizabeth (1990), ‘The Diagnosticity of a Lineup Should Not Be Confused with the Diagnostic
Value of Nonlineup Evidence’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 75 (5), pp. 511–16.
Williams, Laron and Whitten, Guy (2015), ‘Don’t Stand So Close to Me: Spatial Contagion Effects and Party Competition’,
American Journal of Political Science, 59 (2 AQ28
¶
).
Wilson, Rick (2011), ‘TheContributionofBehavioral Economics toPolitical Science’,Annual ReviewofPolitical Science, 14, pp. 201–23.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press).
Zuroff, David (1989), ‘Judgments of Frequency of Social Stimuli: How Schematic Is Person Memory?’, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 56 (6), pp. 890–98.
Zysman, John (1983), Governments, Markets, and Growth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Appendix 1. Sample composition
Appendix 2. Robustness of macroeconomic variables
As mentioned earlier, we did not expect macroeconomic variables to inﬂuence our results as they do
not vary over the event window. Nonetheless, we checked their effect onmarket reactions to elections.
We tested ﬁve variables, all of which we sourced from the IMF’s most recent set of World Economic
Outlook data. They are the ﬁscal balance as a percentage of GDP, GDP growth, inﬂation, debt as a per-
centage of GDP and relative absolute debt. The ﬁrst four are regarded as the key macroeconomic vari-
ables affecting the value of sovereignbonds (Baldacci andKumar 2010). The last is a bitmore unusual. It
Table A1. Elections in the sample.
No. of elections First election Last election
Australia 12 1977 2007
Austria 6 1990 2006
Belgium 6 1987 2007
Canada 8 1980 2006
Denmark 8 1987 2007
Finland 4 1995 2007
France 6 1986 2007
Germany 8 1980 2005
Ireland 6 1987 2007
Italy 4 1992 2006
Japan 6 1990 2005
Netherlands 7 1981 2006
New Zealand 7 1987 2005
Norway 5 1985 2001
Portugal 4 1995 2005
Spain 4 1993 2004
Sweden 6 1988 2006
Switzerland 8 1975 2003
United Kingdom 7 1979 2005
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records the share of each country in the overall annual debt of the sample countries in constant US
dollars. It is used to test the liquidity hypothesis that the less liquid the debt market, the greater the
under-reaction. The debt ﬁgures are missing for most of our older elections. To minimise the loss of
observations, models 1 and 2 of Table A2 add the ﬁscal balance, GDP growth and inﬂation to our fam-
iliar political models. The macroeconomic variables are never statistically signiﬁcant. Even though
including these factors loses 12 observations, there is little change in the models. Adding either of
the debt variables loses another 9 observations (models 4–6). In doing so, the strong increase in the
effect of political constraints between day 1 and day 15 disappears. However, this is almost entirely
due to the inﬂuence of the famous unexpected victory of the conservatives in the 1992 British election.
If it is excluded, the familiar pattern of under-reaction to majoritarian elections appears once again.
Table A2. Predicting the impact (absolute CAR) of elections using Poisson regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Day 1 15 1 15 1 15
Political
constraints
−6.062
(10.077)
−9.265
(8.099)
−10.224
(8.097)
−9.124 (8.633) −10.007
(8.021)
−7.055
(9.385)
Political constraints2 3.011 (10.341) 5.888 (8.918) 6.875 (8.847) 6.506 (9.834)
6.319 (8.309) 3.634
(10.069)
Closeness of
elections
0.037
(0.654)
−0.145 (0.531) 0.116 (0.610) 0.050 (0.444) 0.085 (0.600) −0.008 (0.485)
Ideological
change
0.231
(0.100)*
0.190 (0.082)* 0.197 (0.098)* 0.148 (0.083)+ 0.214 (0.111)+ 0.176 (0.090)+
Weekend −0.609
(0.384)
−0.370 (0.213)+ −0.154 (0.479) −0.214 (0.198) −0.146 (0.490) −0.198 (0.240)
Fiscal
balance
0.039
(0.136)
−0.057 (0.097) −4.631 (8.623) −14.704 (7.726)+ −1.860 (6.421) −9.443 (7.394)
GDP growth −0.109
(0.098)
−0.036 (0.049) −0.003 (0.102) 0.046 (0.069) −0.006 (0.116) 0.026 (0.066)
Inﬂation 0.006
(0.038)
0.039 (0.035) 0.020 (0.039) 0.046 (0.033) 0.027 (0.042) 0.047 (0.040)
Debt/GDP −0.002 (0.007) −0.00 (0.008)
Debt share 1.943 (1.660) −0.519 (2.371)
Constant −0.636
(2.267)
1.109 (1.731) −0.197 (2.184) 0.827 (1.901) −0.374 (2.027) 0.091 (2.167)
Wald χ2 50.19** 97.09** 102.81** 39.81** 68.41** 26.44**
Observations 110 110 101 101 101 101
Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%.
**Signiﬁcant at 1%.
+Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Appendix 3. Robustness of country effects AQ29
¶
Appendix 4. Robustness of ideological swing
We reran our usual models, but distinguishing between swings to the left and to the right. This dis-
tinction does not change our principal result of under-reaction increasing as political constraint
decreases. There is some evidence of heterogeneous ideological effects. The rightward swing is stat-
istically signiﬁcant and almost three times the size of its leftward equivalent on day 1. However, we
ﬁnd the opposite for day 15. Left swing is signiﬁcant at 1% and is four times the size of a swing to the
right. The equations suggest that markets under-react to leftward swings and over-react to rightward
swings. This seems strange but may be worthy of further investigation.
Table A3. Predicting the impact (absolute CAR) of elections using Poisson regression.
(1) (2)
Day 1 15
Political constraints −10.933 (17.556) −18.978 (15.379)
Political constraints2 7.749 (21.211) 15.318 (16.980)
Closeness of elections −0.305 (0.612) 0.577 (0.601)
Ideological change 0.206 (0.113)+ 0.243 (0.080)**
Weekend −0.260 (0.302) −0.702 (0.258)**
Austria −1.528 (0.177)** −1.669 (0.120)**
Belgium −0.666 (1.656) −1.103 (1.129)
Canada −0.703 (0.155)** −0.594 (0.177)**
Denmark 0.545 (0.411) 0.290 (0.298)
Finland −0.829 (0.328)* 0.679 (0.268)*
France −1.299 (0.259)** 0.128 (0.312)
Germany −0.935 (0.235)** 0.054 (0.136)
Ireland −1.283 (0.199) −0.031 (0.215)
Italy −0.003 (0.234) −0.735 (0.187)**
Japan 0.045 (0.443) 0.362 (0.330)
Netherlands −0.888 (0.552) −0.477 (0.336)
New Zealand −0.074 (0.197) −0.110 (0.320)
Norway −0.430 (0.328) 0.398 (0.262)
Portugal −0.666 (0.361)+ 0.113 (0.218)
Spain 0.452 (0.361) 0.413 (0.272)
Sweden 0.103 (0.214) 0.561 (0.196)**
Switzerland −1.081 (0.863) 0.846 (0.674)
Constant 0.487 (3.515) 3.496 (3.33)
Wald χ2 – –
Observations 122 122
Countries 19 19
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country.
It is impossible to compute the Wald statistic because there are too many parameters in the model relative to the number of clus-
ters for standard errors. However, the purpose of this exercise was to see whether the inclusion of country dummies would
change the result for political constraints and the coefﬁcients are not affected by this degrees of freedom issue. The UK has
been dropped due to collinearity.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%.
**Signiﬁcant at 1%.
+Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Appendix 5. Different event windows
Table A5. Political constraints coefﬁcients across event windows.
Days since election Political constraints Political constraints squared Joint signiﬁcance (χ2)
1 −6.368047 3.575616 4.03
2 4.361237 −8.039756 10.17**
3 12.6964 −15.71342 9.20*
4 10.55155 −14.01795 10.14**
5 1.554503 −5.551133 9.99**
6 −12.63892 8.843343 17.65**
7 −12.34953 9.373381 12.49**
8 −15.54882 12.79132 16.84**
9 −8.771182 5.966565 10.14**
10 −8.394363 5.788785 12.01**
11 −6.618319 4.436127 8.78*
12 −9.889899 7.584578 14.22**
13 −11.59326 9.106946 16.77**
14 −11.44269 8.210004 20.08**
15 −12.70493 9.367309 22.51**
Notes: Rows 1 and 15 are derived from models 1 and 3 of Table 3. The other rows are from identical models run with different
dependent variables, increasing the number of days used to calculate the CAR.
Table A4. Predicting the impact (absolute CAR) of elections using Poisson regression.
(1) (2)
Day 1 15
Political constraints −7.934 (9.443) −11.111 (7.149)
Political constraints2 5.073 (9.69) 7.830 (7.887)
Closeness of elections −0.211 (0.42) 0.326 (0.454)
Left swing 0.092 (0.095) 0.239 (0.075)**
Right swing 0.261 (0.128)* 0.059 (0.098)
Weekend −0.441 (0.348) −0.456 (0.206)*
Constant −0.477 (2.160) 1.564 (1.565)
Wald χ2 20.55** 37.98**
Observations 122 122
Countries 19 19
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%.
**Signiﬁcant at 1%.
+Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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